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Preface
This report is based upon a workshop, called "CyberFest," held at Sandia National Laboratories on May 27-30, 2008 . The event was organized by the Strategic Studies Department, Strategic Foundations Organization, Institutional Development Center of Sandia. It was formally hosted by Robert Leland, Director of Computing and Network Services, and held in support of a strategic planning effort he was leading. Participants in the workshop came from organizations both outside and inside Sandia; background information on the participants can be found in an appendix to the report.
Beginning on the evening of May 27, and continuing through May 28 and 29, participants joined a variety of activities-written, simultaneous "brainstorming," sub-divided working team deliberations, and full-group discussions-all designed to elicit creative thinking about the problems of cyber security. These activities were held on an unclassified basis, with a smaller, security-cleared subset of participants remaining on May 30 for further, classified discussions. (This report is based on the unclassified discussions; a separate, short classified annex will also be issued.) The working theme was the use of metaphors in thinking about cyber security; the rationale for this theme is explained in the body of the report.
The report is not a transcript of the workshop proceedings, but a paper derived from written materials produced and notes taken during the workshop, post-workshop comments on the draft from participant-reviewers, and some supplemental analysis and references. Workshop participants were promised individual non-attribution to encourage frankness, but whatever is useful in the report can be credited to their contributions.
Lori Parrott managed the workshop preparations, both substantively and administratively. Judy Moore led development of the workshop design and agenda and helped organize the output for use in the report. Tom Karas drafted the report.
Executive Summary
This report is based upon a workshop, called "CyberFest," held at Sandia National Laboratories on May 27-30, 2008 . Participants in the workshop came from organizations both outside and inside Sandia. The premise of the workshop was that thinking about cyber security from a metaphorical perspective could lead to a deeper understanding of current approaches to cyber defense and perhaps to some creative new approaches.
As Lakoff and Johnson concluded in 1980, metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and mostly unconscious. Exploration of the metaphors we use in the cyber security domain may help improve our thinking and discussion in four ways. First, we may gain a clearer understanding of the value and limitations of the concepts we have mapped from other domains into the cyber security domain. Second, trying out less common or new metaphors may feed the imagination of researchers and policy developers. Third, metaphors that work particularly well might be developed into a whole new models or sets of concepts for approaching cyber security problems. Fourth, a metaphor serves a heuristic purpose --bringing clearer understanding of abstract concepts from the field of cyber security into domains with which the non-specialist may be more familiar.
Workshop participants considered four scenarios illustrating difficult threat-related problems of information confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These scenarios included exploitation of a software vulnerability leading to loss of information services in a large company, large-scale theft of proprietary information by a company employee, loss of a valuable oil exploration submersible traced to design and test errors traced to (intentionally?) flawed hardware and software, and an un-attributable network attack leading to disasters in an air traffic control system. These scenarios illustrated not only a set of security issues, but also the influence that implicit metaphors and issue framing can have on problem definitions and solutions.
Next, a wide range of metaphors was considered, including those relating to military and other types of conflict, biological, health care, markets, three-dimensional space, and physical asset protection. Metaphor examples that participants discussed include fortress, cops and robbers, warfare, complex adaptive systems, ecosystem biodiversity, immune systems, programmed cell death, disease prevention and health care, market incentives, risk management, outer space, the US western frontier, the global environment, banking, games, martial arts, and military deterrence.
Discussion of these in turn led to consideration of a variety of possible approaches for improving cyber security in the future. From the proposed approaches, three were formulated for further discussion.
An approach labeled "Heterogeneity" drew primarily from the metaphor of biological diversity. Computer systems may fail because of hardware software flaws that emerge only when particular, unforeseen system states are reached-in analogy to natural catastrophes in ecosystems-and homogeneous systems are more likely to fail completely. Similarly, computer networks in which all the components have the same vulnerabilities are easier for attackers to bring down, but more diverse systems would deprive attackers of sufficient target knowledge to do as much damage. What is more, systems comprising diverse hardware and software components would make it easier to confuse and deceive attackers.
It can thus be argued that diversity is one of the ways of "baking" security into systemsdesigning them from the start to be more secure, as opposed to adding on security measures later. Moving toward more diverse systems would require both technical and policy advances. Technically, human designed systems tend to converge to uniformity. Therefore, there is a need for new ways of creating software (and perhaps hardware components) that automatically introduce diversity.
A second approach, "Motivating Secure Behavior," took a market perspective on the adoption of cyber security measures. The central concept is that many of the vulnerabilities in current systems can be traced to human behaviors shaped by the structure of incentives facing both suppliers and users of information technology. Therefore, the overall task is to make it easier for people to do the "right" thing and harder to do the "wrong" thing. Responsibilities (and therefore incentives) should be developed for and by different system levels and actors: Individuals (e.g., US consumers, managers); Institutions (e.g., Microsoft, Universities); Government agencies (e.g., DOE, Sandia); Public Policy (e.g., Congress, Executive Branch, Agencies, Courts, States); and Standards bodies/associations.
A disadvantage of this focus is that it is vague about exactly what technologies developers, vendors, buyers, and users should be "incentivized" to create, sell, buy, and use.
The third approach was called "Cyber Wellness," exploring analogies with efforts to improve individual and public health. Its objective is to keep the population (of users and networked systems) as healthy as possible: resistant to attacks, resilient under stresses, wary of dangerous environments, treatable if diseased, and able to limit contagions. Much responsibility for personal (local) wellness depends on individuals, but various levels of corporate and public health management, from the local to the international, are equally important. Numerous analogies emerged between human wellness mechanisms and institutions on the one hand and actual or potential cyber security arrangements on the other.
An advantage of this approach is that it encourages thinking about the interactions of all the components at all levels of the "health" maintenance system, ranging from the individual who practices risky or less risky behaviors to the institutions who analyze, model, financially underwrite, or incentivize behaviors. For these discussions, however, the group developing the approach chose to pursue a vision of the future of computing in which users are represented by "avatars," or mobile software agents whose "health" is monitored and maintained. In this way, each user has a direct incentive to keep his or her avatar in good health. Security is a distributed, rather than centralized, function. Although the "avatar" vision does imply a new approach to "baking" security into the computer networking systems of the future, it is also true that mobile software agents and the computers that host them face a number of security challenges of their own.
Some final observations of workshop participants were that those responsible for setting future directions for cyber security need to have a bold vision; develop a gradual adoption/implementation strategy; accept and sustain a strategy through the inevitably gradual and evolutionary process that will ensue; and show benefits for users and operators, not just push solutions that aren't seen as beneficial outside the security world.
I.
Why Metaphors?
Metaphor may commonly be dismissed as a subject relevant only for humanities scholars or literary critics, but not as one particularly relevant for specialists in cyber security. The premise of the workshop reported here, however, was that thinking about cyber security from a metaphorical perspective could lead to a deeper understanding of current approaches to cyber defense and perhaps to some creative new approaches.
Nearly 30 years ago, linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson began a book by arguing that:
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish-a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language...most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
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Among their conclusions were:
• Conceptual metaphors are grounded in everyday experience.
• Abstract thought is largely metaphorical.
• Metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and mostly unconscious.
• Our conceptual systems are not consistent overall, since the metaphors used to reason about concepts may be inconsistent.
• We live our lives on the basis of inferences we derive via metaphor.
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Much of the remainder of this report will illustrate these points.
Given that metaphor is our dominating theme, it may be useful to offer a definition of metaphor. One scholar proposes the following:
In the cognitive linguistic view, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain...Examples of this include when we talk and think about life in terms of journeys, about arguments in terms of war, about love also in terms of journeys, about theories in terms of buildings, about ideas in terms of food, about social organizations in terms of plants, and many others. A convenient shorthand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following: CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (A) IS CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (B), which is what is called a conceptual metaphor. A conceptual metaphor consists of two conceptual domains, in which one domain is understood in terms of another. A conceptual domain is any coherent organization of experience. Thus, for example, we have coherently organized knowledge about journeys that we rely on for understanding life. In fact, the very notion of "cyber space" is itself a metaphor, and most concepts relating to cyber security have been "mapped" into that realm from other domains.
Conscious awareness of the metaphors we use in the cyber security domain may help improve our thinking and discussion in four ways. First, we may gain a better understanding of the value and limitations of the concepts we have mapped from other domains into the cyber security domain. For example, Deborah Frincke and Matt Bishop have pointed out that in the computer security field, ...the original and most commonly used metaphor is the computer (or network) as a fortress, the walls of which must be guarded against potential breaches. This metaphor is useful, but like all metaphors, it is not precise. Understanding the differences between the metaphor of a fortress and the realities of securing a system is crucial to students understanding the subtleties of computer security. Second, trying out less commonly used metaphors may feed the imagination. Analogies from other domains that seem to apply to cyber security may lead to new ideas for solving problems. Even analogies that don't work well may suggest other ones that work better. For example, one workshop participant pointed out that a cyber "fortress" may have a moat and strong walls, but may also have wires running underneath the walls and carrying out the information that is supposed to be protected. Plus, additional, new kinds, of defensive measure may be necessary. This is what is considered an ampliative use of metaphor.
Third, metaphors that work particularly well might be developed into whole new models or sets of concepts for approaching cyber security problems. This possibility is illustrated in Section IV below. Fourth, a metaphor can work as a communication tool--bringing abstract concepts from the field of cyber security into domains with which the non-specialist may be more familiar. A metaphor may heuristically help computer users understand why they should follow certain protective procedures. Or, a particularly powerful metaphor might help public policy makers understand how a new cyber security program would work, and why it is important that they should support it.
Examples of all four of these potential benefits emerged during the workshop.
II. Observations on Threats to Cyber Security
The range of potential threats in the cyber world is as wide as our use of information technology. (See Box 1 for a broad survey of the dangers.) Generally speaking, the literature on cyber security usually refers to three characteristics of information systems that need protection:
1. Confidentiality-privacy of information and communications. In government this might mean, for example, assuring access to classified information only by authorized individuals. In commerce, it might mean the protection of proprietary information.
2. Integrity-assurance that information or computing processes have not been tampered with or destroyed. In the case of critical infrastructures (say, for example, the power grid), loss of data integrity could take the form of destructive instructions to the system resulting in financial, material, or human losses.
3. Availability-assurance that information or services are there when needed. Denial of service attacks, which overload system servers and shut down websites, are examples of interfering with availability.
Box 1: Cyber Security Threats
WHAT IS AT STAKE Information technology (IT) is essential to the day-to-day operations of companies, organizations, and government. People's personal lives also involve computing in areas ranging from communication with family and friends to online banking and other household and financial management activities. Companies large and small are ever more reliant on IT to support diverse business processes, ranging from payroll and accounting, to tracking of inventory, operation of sales, and support for research and development (R&D)-that is, IT systems are increasingly needed for companies to be able to operate at all. Critical national infrastructures --such as those associated with energy, banking and finance, defense, law enforcement, transportation, water systems, and government and private emergency services --also depend on IT-based systems and networks; of course, the telecommunications system itself is a critical infrastructure for the nation. Such dependence on IT will grow. But in the future, computing and communications technologies will also be embedded in applications in which they are essentially invisible to their users. A future of "pervasive computing" will see IT ubiquitously integrated into everyday objects in order to enhance their usefulness, and these objects will be interconnected in ways that further multiply their usefulness. In addition, a growing focus on innovation in the future will require the automation and integration of various services to provide rapid response tailored to the needs of users across the entire economy.
The ability to fully realize the benefits of IT depends on these systems being secure --and yet nearly all indications of the size of the threat, whether associated with losses or damage, type of attack, or presence of vulnerability, indicate a continuously worsening problem. Moreover, it is almost certainly the case that reports understate the actual scope of the threat, since some successful attacks are not noticed and others noticed but not reported.
The gaps between commercial practice and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure are still wide. Meanwhile, the ability of individuals, organizations, or even state actors to attack the nation's institutions, its people's identities, and their online lives in cyberspace has grown substantially. Industry trends toward commoditization have resulted in clear targets for focused attacks, making coordinated attacks by hundreds of thousands of co-opted cooperating agents practical for the first time in history.
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To encourage some concreteness in metaphorical discussions of cyber security, four scenarios of cyber security problems were presented to the workshop participants. Each of these scenarios essentially represented one or more of the above three cyber security risks, although they were not framed that way. What turned out to be interesting about the scenarios was that they not only illustrated the kinds of problems that cyber security personnel worry about, but they also illustrated two important characteristics of the much of the discourse on this subject (as well as most discourse on most subjects). That is, first, metaphors are hard to avoid, even if we are not consciously using them. Second, how a problem is framed frequently implies certain kinds of solutions, while implicitly reducing the likelihood that others will be considered.
The potential consequences of a lack of security in cyberspace fall into three broad categories. First is the threat of catastrophe --a cyber attack, especially in conjunction with a physical attack, could result in thousands of deaths and many billions of dollars of damage in a very short time. Second is frictional drag on important economic and security-related processes. Today, insecurities in cyberspace systems and networks allow adversaries (in particular, criminals) to extract billions of dollars in fraud and extortion --and force businesses to expend additional resources to defend themselves against these threats. If cyberspace does not become more secure, the citizens, businesses, and governments of tomorrow will continue to face similar pressures, and most likely on a greater scale. Third, concerns about insecurity may inhibit the use of IT in the future and thus lead to a self-denial of the benefits that IT brings, benefits that will be needed for the national competitiveness of the United States as well as for national and homeland security.
THE BROAD RANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND GOALS OF CYBERATTACKERS
A very broad spectrum of actors, ranging from lone hackers to major nation-states, poses security risks to the nation's IT infrastructure. Organized crime (e.g., drug cartels) and transnational terrorists (and terrorist organizations, perhaps state-sponsored) occupy a region in between these two extremes, but they are more similar to the nation-state than to the lone hacker.
High-end attackers are qualitatively different from others by virtue of their greater resources --money, talent, time, organizational support and commitment, and goals. These adversaries can thus target vulnerabilities at any point in the IT supply chain from hardware fabrication to end uses. Furthermore, they are usually highly capable of exploiting human or organizational weaknesses over extended periods of time. The bottom line is that the threat is growing in sophistication as well as in magnitude, and against the high-end attacker, many current best practices and security technologies amount to little more than speed bumps --thus requiring additional fundamental research and new approaches, such as a greater emphasis on mitigation and recovery. In this scenario, the victims lose availability of their information (and, if the record damage is permanent, loss of integrity as well). The idea of "zero day" is that attackers are able to discover and exploit the hidden vulnerability before the victims can learn about and fix it. The mystery of the origins of the attack leaves open a range of metaphors: are the attackers vandals, industrial saboteurs, thieves, terrorists, or a national military preparing for some broader conflict? Because known "best practices" cannot detect the vulnerability in advance, and because the attack comes without warning, the implied solutions would seem to fall into two categories: a. build future information systems that are somehow inherently less prone to such vulnerabilities, or b. build resiliency or redundancy into existing systems so that they might fail more gracefully and recover more easily.
During the workshop, category "a)" received more discussion. The implied metaphor in the second scenario is that of the fortress holding valuable items that are stolen by a person inside the fortress. The loss in this scenario is that of confidentiality of information. A useful observation to be made about this scenario is that while it is possible to imagine technologies that make it more difficult to do the "wrong" thing (thus far, technologies appear to have made it easier), in the end human beings are crucial components in information systems. Some humans will make mistakes, while others will intentionally steal or inflict damage. But humans will have to be trusted as long as the technologies serve human purposes. Wider access to information systems may increase vulnerability to losses of confidentiality and integrity; narrower access to only the most trusted persons compromises availability. 5 The perfectly secure environment will be a workfree environment. The concept of "pedigree" is itself a metaphor, applying the family tree concept usually used for humans, dogs, and horses. In this case, integrity is lost in both system hardware and software components-which in turn leads to physical losses. It is unclear from the scenario whether the faults were accidentally or intentionally built into the components. The scenario illustrates the fuzzy line between reliability as a problem and security as a problem. Of particular concern to cyber security specialists is the potential for intentional, undetected introduction of flaws at various links in the supply chain.
Workshop participants pointed out that even well-traced pedigrees may not ensure security. "Trusted" components may nevertheless interact in untrustworthy ways; patches to correct problems can introduce new problems; components may be surreptitiously changed in transit from one trusted party to another; or, pedigrees may be counterfeited. It is not clear what entity could be created that could reliably guarantee pedigrees.
One approach to the problem is to try to so control production processes that the opportunity to introduce flaws is greatly reduced. Another is to try to mitigate the potential impacts of poorly "pedigreed" components. In this case, loss of system availability results in serious loss of human life and economic resources. If caused (or intentionally enabled) by a national government, the metaphor of "warfare" would come to mind. If a non-governmental group intended to cause something like the damage that occurred, the act would probably be called "terrorism." If the attacks were conducted by hackers intent on mischief, but not foreseeing the actual consequences, the perpetrators would at least be considered to be "cyber criminals." In workshop discussions, the prevailing metaphor was "cops and robbers." Implicit in characterizing the scenario as a problem of attribution, as opposed to a problem of denial of service, is a focus on finding and punishing the perpetrators as a means of deterring them or others from committing such acts in the future. As desirable as that may be, some workshop participants questioned whether the best cyber security resource allocation would be toward solving the extremely difficult problem of ferreting out the attackers, or toward better securing critical information systems.
Some Issues Relating to Threats Targets
As the National Academy report quoted in Box 1 points out, a broad spectrum of actors poses even a broader spectrum of threats to the information technology infrastructure. From a public policy point of view, the question arises as to whether there is a special class of "national security" targets that either pose special problems, or that can and should be protected in different ways than other, civilian and commercial, targets. Military operational command and control systems might constitute one such set of targets. Intelligence information systems might be another. Systems for managing the nuclear weapons stockpile might be a third. From a Federal Government perspective, it might make sense to treat these potential cyber security problems separately from others. They are at the center of the government's defense and war-making capabilities. To some extent, their information systems maybe isolatable from the Internet or other broad networks. And, because the potential consequences of attacks are so high, it may be worth applying technology solutions that would be considered unaffordable in commerce or in other day-to-day governmental operations.
On the other hand, it can be argued that attacks on other critical infrastructure systems (e.g., the power grid, telecommunications, or financial operations) not directly connected to military functions could cause as much damage to the nation as attacks on military-related systems. In addition, , the national security arms of government cannot afford to concentrate solely on a narrow set of vulnerabilities, but have to protect the nation as a whole if they are to protect themselves:
…[networked systems] have been incorporated into virtually every sector of the Nation's critical infrastructure -including communications, utilities, finance, transportation, law enforcement, and defense. Indeed, these sectors are now critically reliant on the underlying IT infrastructure.
Beyond economic repercussions, the risks to our Nation's security are clear. In addition to the potential for attacks on critical targets within our borders, our national defense systems are at risk as well, because the military increasingly relies on ubiquitous communication and the networks that support it. The Global Information Grid (GIG), which is projected to cost as much as $100 billion and is intended to improve military communications by linking weapons, intelligence, and military personnel to each other, represents one such critical network. Since military networks interconnect with those in the civilian sector or use similar hardware or software, they are susceptible to any vulnerability in these other networks or technologies. Thus cyber security in the civilian and military sectors is intrinsically linked.
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Attackers
The spectrum of potential attackers may range from the teenaged vandal to the sophisticated nation-state. And the nation-state determined to carry out acts of "cyber warfare" might have simultaneous access to a range of attack modes not generally available to lesser adversaries: a substantial cyber warfare R and D base, large numbers of highly skilled cyber "warriors," embedded spies or saboteurs, kinetic energy attacks on hardware or personnel, and perhaps, latent hardware or software vulnerabilities introduced into government procurement supply chains. This class of attackers might also use particular techniques not usually seen in the realm of day to day cyber crime and mischief. (On the other hand, they might utilize frequently seen modes of attack (e.g., a botnet denial-ofservice attack) to help evade attribution and retribution.)
III. Metaphors Old and New
Participants in the workshop were asked to "brainstorm" a list of potential metaphors applicable to cyber security. They were asked, in addition, to identifying the most common metaphors underlying current discussions of cyber security, to list as many others as they could think of. The newer or rarer metaphors were then grouped into several categories to facilitate further elaboration.
Predominant Metaphors
As mentioned above, a common metaphor in cyber security is that of the fortress.
7 A valued body of information is held within a walled enclosure, perhaps encircled by a moat, accessed by portals or gates, and guarded by watchmen assigned to keep out the unauthorized. A second common metaphor is that of cops and robbers: criminals (or maybe just vandals) break into the house and steal valuables. Forensic measures are taken to track them down, after which they are identified and legally prosecuted. A third common metaphor is that of warfare: enemies, using various weapons and tactics, attack and steal or destroy property (or perhaps just commit espionage) in order to achieve some strategic goal.
Newer metaphors Biological
Some cyber security metaphors come from the field of biology. A broad approach is to think of cyber systems as instances of complex, adaptive systems-as our biological systems. One example of such systems is the ecosystem: a complex system of interdependent species in populations in a particular kind of environment. A concept drawn from ecosystem studies is that of biodiversity: the idea that systems with diverse components are likely to be more stable, resilient, and adaptable to change. This metaphor is utilized below (p.26) in the section on "Heterogeneity." Another example is that of biological immune systems, the subject of a growing body of computer science literature and attempts to show how the mechanisms of immune processes systems can be imitated in hardware and software systems. A related metaphor is that of programmed cell suicide-apoptosis-in multicellular organisms: computers might be programmed to recognize if they have become infected and detach themselves from their network. 8 
Medical/Health
Numerous analogies between personal and public health measures and cyber security measures can be imagined. These are not enumerated here because they will be explored more fully below in Section IV.
Market Systems
In many ways, of course, the Internet is a vast marketplace in which goods and services are being bought and sold continuously, even though it lacks the physical accoutrements of traditional marketplaces. Hardware and software systems themselves are bought and sold. But the direction of this metaphorical exploration was to consider how market and economic principles might be applied to cyber security problems. Given that the cyber "world" is subject to economic forces that have historically not led to highly secure systems, could one imagine changes in economic incentives that might change that trend? 9 Thinking from an economic perspective, then, could incentives be created that would harness the self-interest of the participants in the market in ways that would lead to greater security? On the one hand, it would be desirable, if possible, to reduce the profits from the development and use of malware by cybercriminals. On the defensive side, as commercial interests encounter increasing losses from cyber crime, incentives to enhance security might emerge without much external prompting. As losses cut further into profits, purchasers of computers and software might demand that manufacturers guarantee some level of security in their products. They might also be willing to pay higher prices for greater levels of security. Insurers might offer indemnities for cyber related losses, provided that those insured adhered to higher security standards or purchased security measures recommended by the insurers.
Beyond the loss-induced changes in economic incentives, the Federal Government, taking cyber security as a public good, might exert its ability to affect economic incentives by using taxation, subsidies, regulations, legislation, and purchasing power to encourage higher standards of security in the market.
A related business concept is that of risk management, in which organizations (possibly corporations, possibly government agencies) attempt to assess the risks they face, prioritize them, and take management measures appropriate to those risks: avoidance, reduction, acceptance, or transfer. Each of these has a cost, which is weighed against the potential losses. Workshop participants pointed out that although estimating the uncertainties involved is difficult in any case, business have the advantage that the assets they hope to protect are usually fungible-can be translated into financial gain or loss. In the case of governmental organizations, on the other hand, losses and costs of protection may not be fungible. For example, a monetary insurance policy (transfer of risk) for the loss of a military or intelligence secret would not be feasible. Or, the political cost of an apparent breach of security may outweigh any clear direct damage from the loss of a secret.
Spatial Metaphors
The term "cyberspace" was invented in 1982 by science fiction writer William Gibson, and it became commonly applied to the Internet and the World Wide Web in the 1990's. It is a good example of how a metaphor-mapping of one domain (three dimensional space as humans experience it) to another domain (computer networks)-has become so pervasive that we scarcely even think of it as a metaphor any more. The newly formed Air Force Cyber Command describes its mission in ways that imply that cyberspace is not a metaphorical concept, but just one more class of physical spaces that it calls "domains":
Cyberspace is a domain like land, sea, air and space and it must be defended. Although we've been operating in cyberspace for a very long time-since the invention of telegraph, radio and radar-we now conduct the full range of military operations in this domain. Just as the sea domain is characterized by use of water to conduct operations, and the air domain characterized by operations in and through the atmosphere, the cyber domain is characterized by use of electronic systems and the electromagnetic spectrum.
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Several variations on the spatial metaphor emerged during the workshop "brainstorming." While the Air Force may perceive the sea domain as a place where military operations are conducted, there are other ocean metaphors that can be applied to cyberspace. It is a global domain across which many kinds of traffic (personal, commercial, civil, military) move. To varying degrees national users agree to "rules of the road," but there is no single sovereign to enforce a well-codified body of law. Military operations may be conducted there, as well as piracy.
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Another possible metaphor is that of outer space, through which many national (and some international) satellites move continuously across national boundaries, providing a variety of services. Satellites are vulnerable to various kinds of attack, the origins of some of which might be difficult to determine. Defensive measures can be taken, but the advantage seems to be with the offense. Some countries (e.g., the U.S.) are more dependent on satellite services than others, and therefore there are asymmetries in national vulnerabilities. This makes deterrence by threat of retaliation in kind problematic.
Some spatial metaphors may be more explicit about mapping the social, economic, and political characteristics of the "source domain" to the "target domain." An example is the Wild West or U.S. Western frontier metaphor:
Like all metaphors, the Western Frontier metaphor provides a particular perspective on the object described. The metaphor constructs the Inter-net as a version of the Western Frontier, a historical phenomenon that glorifies individuality and the benefits of minimal government. Put slightly differently, the Western Frontier metaphor suggests that the Internet will permit everyone to live a modern, improved version of America's westward expansion. Like the American West, the unregulated Internet has inherent characteristics that support unlimited economic opportunity, equality, individual freedom, and even political liberty.
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Another suggested metaphor was that of the global environment, with emphasis on the "tragedy of the commons" (itself yet another metaphor). The emphasis here is on the 10 See http://www.afcyber.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=10784 In modern times, the nearly ubiquitous availability of powerful computing systems, along with the proliferation of high-speed networks, have converged to create a new version of the high seas--the cyber seas. The Internet has the potential to significantly impact the United States' position as a world leader. Nevertheless, for the last decade, U.S. cybersecurity policy has been inconsistent and reactionary. The private sector has often been left to fend for itself, and sporadic policy statements have left U.S. government organizations, private enterprises and allies uncertain of which tack the nation will take to secure the cyber frontier.
"Freedom of the Cyber Seas," at http://www.csoonline.com/article/329164/Freedom_of_the_Cyber_Seas/1 s phenomenon that, while most of the actors in cyberspace have a common interest in the maintenance and improvement of security, the incentives facing them individually do not reward behavior that serves the common interest.
Physical Asset Protection
This group of metaphors also draws upon analogies to objects in the spatial (physical) world, but in narrower, more specific ways. The castle or fortress metaphor introduced above (p. 10) falls in this category. One observation about castles is that not only do they attempt to maintain layers of physical protection, but they may operate at varying levels of security (e.g. portcullis up or down) depending on the level of threat; accordingly, there will be times when normal levels of traffic in and out will be reduced. The same may apply to computer network protection-the highest level of protection entails shutting down the system. The castle metaphor can also make more apparent other weaknesses of current approaches to cyber security: castles are reactive, immovable, inflexible, unable to adapt to novel attacks (explosives made castles obsolete).
A bank might be seen as a version of the fortress-walls, vaults, guns, guards protecting valuable objects (gold, currency, safe-deposit items.) In a way, however, banks were like cyber-entities before there was cyberspace. Credit is a promise of cash, but banks loan out more than they hold in actual currency. Since departure from the gold standard, currency itself is a promise to pay something else. More and more finance is conducted electronically, and the objects to be protected are pieces of information, connecting buyers and sellers, owners and borrowers with numbers of "credits." Such security features as accurate identification of actors, non-repudiation of transactions, and integrity of data were important to banking before banking moved into cyberspace.
Numerous analogies between banking and cyber asset protection were suggested. Audits of records help track assets. Trusted employees (insiders) can steal or enable stealing. Protected assets have to flow in and out to maintain the business. Where cyber security relates to money, companies can write off or insure against financial losses. On the other hand, some losses of information are irreplaceable (e.g., high value intellectual property or very important government or military secrets).
The first session of the workshop was held in a hotel, and it occurred to some participants that a hotel might be considered as a metaphor for cyber security issues. The following features of security issues in the hotel business were cited as have possible analogies to cyber security:
• The asset being protected at the hotel is the ability to sell/utilize rooms to make a profit.
• Capacity planning takes place under dynamic situations (holiday travels, slow season, etc.).
• Hotels must innovate to survive, and meet the needs of customers; it is important to know your brand and your customers (user of the asset-e.g., some times of year your customers are parents of graduating students, other times vacationers, others.)
• Hotels supposedly know who checked-in, but can't know for sure who is using the room (fake ID, sell/give your room key away to another person, 10 people sleep in one room, etc.) • Hotels have some control (staff go into the room to clean every day and can notice things amiss, cameras monitor hallways and elevators, some hotels require room keys to use the elevator).
• The lowest-paid and least-educated employee is given the master key to all the rooms of the hotel.
• Hotels have an implied sense of security that is not really all that valid.
• There is a cost of doing business that is acceptable to hotels (stealing towels, breaking into mini-bar, room damage), etc. But they can handle this by charging your credit card later for stolen items or damages.
Varieties of Conflict
Since cyber security is intrinsically a conflict issue, some participants asked whether "conflict" could really be considered a metaphor. Taken in its most abstract sense of opposition between two entities, perhaps it can't be considered a metaphor. Even so, as soon as the concept of conflict is further characterized, metaphors seem unavoidable. A predominant metaphor is that of warfare. 13 But our ideas about warfare come from the physical clash of military forces, involving soldiers (or sailors or airmen), kinetic weapons, delivery platforms and vehicles, or at least other tools for attacking or defending against the preceding. Ideas about strategy and tactics can be more abstract, but still derive from the history of physical battle.
Another type of conflict is the competitive game.
14 The question was raised in the workshop whether cyber conflict more closely resembled chess or poker. A chess game (rich in metaphors of combat, even in its playing pieces) involves strategies and tactics, attacks, defenses, counterattacks, captures, sacrifices. These have counterparts in cyber conflict. When the opponent is not a computer, attempts at psychological manipulation may be made. However, the board, pieces, and allowable moves are always known to both sides (though the calculations of the adversary can only be inferred). In poker, each side starts (and for some period of time remains) uncertain about the cards held by the adversary as well as the cards remaining to be dealt. Secrecy and deception are parts of the game. Many would argue that cyber conflict is more like poker than chess.
The Chinese game of Go was nominated as another metaphor for cyber conflict. Two scholars of "netcentric" warfare have argued that
The game of Go provides a better analogy for conflict in the information age, especially for irregular warfare and for networked types of conflict and crime at the low-intensity end of the spectrum... The goal is to control more of the battlespace than one's opponent does. Once emplaced, a piece exerts a presence in that part of the board, making it easier for the player to place additional pieces on nearby points in the process of surrounding territory. As a result, there is almost never a front line, and action may take place almost anywhere on the board at any time. The key battles are less for control of the center than of the corners and sides (since they are easier to box off)… Thus Go, in contrast to chess, is more about distributing one's pieces than about massing them. It is more about proactive insertion and presence than about maneuver. It is more about deciding where to stand than whether to advance or retreat. It is more about developing web-like links among nearby stationary pieces than about moving specialized pieces in combined operations. It is more about creating networks of pieces than about protecting hierarchies of pieces. It is more about fighting to create secure territories than about fighting to the death of one's pieces. Further, there is often a blurring of offense and defense-a single move may both attack and defend simultaneously. Finally, the use of massed concentrations is to be avoided, especially in the early phases of a game, as they may represent a misuse of time and later be susceptible to implosive attacks. This is quite different from chess, which is generally linear, and in which offense and defense are usually easily distinguished, and massing is a virtue. Future conflicts will likely resemble the game of Go more than the game of chess.
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Also suggested as a suitable metaphor was that of the martial arts. The primary concept here was the turning of the adversary's attacks and strengths against him.
Conflict metaphors can serve numerous useful purposes in thinking about cyber security. They stimulate thinking about longer-term strategic as well as immediate tactical defense. They invite exploration of the potential utility of deception in cyber defense as well as offense. 16 (Some recommend studying The Art of War by Sun Tzu, which asserts that "All war is based on deception.") Thinking about the interactions of offense and defense can lead to a complex adaptive systems perspective, which in turn may yield further insights about how to improve security. Some analysts have applied mathematical game theory to cyber security issues.
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The war metaphor also leads to discussions of deterrence. Deterrence may be viewed in a narrower sense of threatening potential attackers with some sort of retaliation, or in a broader sense of generally raising the prospective costs of an attack by improving defenses (whether passive or active) or having the resilience to withstand or quickly recover from whatever damage has been inflicted. As mentioned above, deterrence based on retaliatory threats implies an ability to perform the extremely challenging task of attribution of attack origins. Those favoring an emphasis on retaliatory deterrence point out that attackers always seem to have the advantage: they can keep trying until they succeed, and the success of only one attack out of many may provide satisfactory payoff. Others argue that, given the long-term, multi-sourced character of the threat, resources would be better invested in greatly improved protection than on retaliation in kind, or at the very least, a credible threat of retaliation that has the effect of deterring attack.
A related debate is whether cyber conflict should be approached as an ongoing game likely to continue indefinitely without permanent winners or losers, or whether game-ending victory is possible.
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IV. Some New Approaches to Cyber Security
After the general discussion of metaphors, the workshop participants were asked to propose lines of inquiry for three "breakout" groups that would explore broad system-level ideas for improving cyber security in the future. The concepts informing these inquiries might further develop a metaphor already introduced, utilize some combination of metaphors, or merely be inspired by the preceding discussion. Box 2 lists the ideas proposed, along with a few supporting points for each. Full group discussion of these ideas resulted in the combination of some, the exclusion of others, and the formulation of three topics for further exploration. The three topics were entitled "Heterogeneity," "Motivating Secure Behavior," and "Cyber Wellness." These are described in further detail in the remainder of this report.
Human Error Assumed
Steady state is one in which humans fail. Is elimination of "stupid" errors really the easy part? Put effort into designing a system where you assume human error. Do any other human systems have this solved?
Information ByWay
The way it was built it is a shared responsibility-distributed responsibility. Everyone has "car" insurance. Secrets cost IT dollars. Note: Misconfiguration-any intrusion up to one of criminal intent is usually system misconfiguration. Nation state attacks exploit flaws.
Render Safe
Reduce the internet footprint of compute systems. Recover from attacks to a state of inertness-i.e. when perturbed, return procedurally to a state of trust/safety.
Multicellular Life Metaphor
We have moved from simple computers to very complex systems; analogous to the transition from multicellular to complex systems. What can we learn from evolution of single-cell life to multicellular? Do we have to learn how to get lots of computers to collaborate in a robust manner the hard way?
Wellness Metaphor
Analogies to diet/nutrition/prevention for maintaining system "wellness." Disease/bio attack analogies to cyber attacks. Proposed system discussion context: future national "intelligent" power grid.
Futures Market
Using a futures market to predict large-scale cyber attack: people's greed and self-interest utilized as indicators of impending cyber attack. Those to invest the most will be the ones most confident in an analysis or the ones with some sort of insider/expert knowledge. Also a good way of synthesizing information is distribution throughout the population.
Futures and Trends
Trends say virtual 3D net with avatars for users are the future of the internet: as in "Second Life "game, users have a 3D identity. Avatars holding personal info of each user. How will this affect security?
Cyber Dosimeter
Computer systems given exposure indictors: take a threat that is invisible and make it visible. Measure damage (e.g. risk exposure), measure anomalies, correlate and respond
FEAR:
Apply domain-specific risk models to computer systems Degrade service for those with "risky" behavior Better service with assurance Model: skittish
Characteristics of a future state
In designing a new system, begin with a vision of the desired characteristics, in which security measures are: Intrinsic-built into the overall design Integrated-see bio metaphor and health of our system Flexible-in fact of uncertainty, adapt before anything happens.
Cont'd next page
Heterogeneity
The "Heterogeneity" approach draws on the ecological concept of biodiversity in designing future computer network systems. In a very homogeneous ecological system, severe environmental changes can lead to mass extinctions, while greater diversity increases the chance that at least some species, or individuals within will survive. Computer systems may fail because of hardware software flaws that emerge only when particular, unforeseen system states are reached-in analogy to natural catastrophes in ecosystems-and homogeneous systems are more likely to fail completely.
Similarly, computer networks in which all the components have the same vulnerabilities are easier for attackers to bring down, while more diverse systems would deprive attackers of sufficient target knowledge to do as much damage. What is more, systems comprising diverse hardware and software components would make it easier to confuse and deceive attackers. It can thus be argued that diversity is one of the ways of "baking" security into systems-designing them from the start to be more secure, as opposed to adding on security measures later.
Guaranteed Software:
Require guarantees from software vendors on the absence of bugs. Produce radically simplified software tools (including an operating system), which permit vendors to buy insurance..
Diversity
Push the biological metaphor of biodiversity (such as concepts of speciation, ecological niche, predators, parasites, survival of the fittest, competition). Look for analogies in coping with unexpected threats: alien invasion, asteroid hit, flu pandemic etc. --how could those informed security planning and response? Break system into smallest parts and mix them up. Consider computer systems in which the interfaces between hardware and software components remain static, but the implementations are unpredictable. As in biological systems, this means some of the population will be immune to any attack. Further, for intelligent attacks that hide by working across components, makes the makeup of the various components unpredictable to attack planners.
Fold Construct:
(Approach security from three related, but distinct, perspectives) Social Causes and Solutions Insecurity results from self-interested individual and collective behavior, which must be understood and engaged through cooperation and confrontation Technical causes and solutions The creation, design, and operation of computers and networks creates and influences opportunities for cyber attack, as well as our ability to respond to attack.
Economic markets, tradeoffs and incentives
Security is something society can produce: we must give a broad, diverse, and decentralized collection of actors and institutions the incentive to produce system security and compare/trade its value against other social and human goods and values.
Operational unpredictability would increase their uncertainty about what might be an effective mode of attack. 19 Frequent automated network reconfigurations might be an operational way to introduce heterogeneity. Unpredictability might be increased by varying cryptographic algorithms and keys. It was suggested that "late binding" could also increase attacker uncertainty. 20 A related example offered was that of Google searches, in which there is no way of knowing in advance which of the company's thousands of servers will handle any given request.
User interfaces among the diverse components should be common (necessary for practical use), and could thereby cover underlying diversity in function and implementation. An analogy can be found in automobiles, where dashboard and other controls are fairly standard, while the engine and other subsystem designs may vary quite widely. In the same way, users need not be greatly inconvenienced by underlying variations in computer software and hardware operations. There are techniques (such as object-oriented programming) that make more heterogeneity feasible.
Moving toward more diverse systems would require both technical and policy advances. Technically, human designed systems tend to converge to uniformity. Therefore, there is a need for new ways of creating software (and perhaps hardware components) that automatically introduce diversity. The economics of the industry-imposing incentives for convenience, efficiency, speed, and low cost-have impelled management, developers, and service providers to press for uniformity. Uniformity provides economies of scale in both the production and maintenance of computer systems. Hence, there is a prevailing presumption that standardization, rather than diversity, should be the norm.
Because standardization was so successful in enabling mass production in the industrial revolution, heterogeneity may seem counterintuitive. What is required is for government and industry consumers to recognize the security value of diversity. They might then encourage it by the following:
• yielding to bottom-up desires for diverse hardware and software through more varied procurement and willingness fund non vendor-specific technical support;
• requiring multiple supply sources;
• in procurements, focusing on performance requirements, not technical specifications; and
• demanding that these multiple vendors adhere to common interface and interoperability standards.
Although most procurement of information technology is commercial, US Government procurement standards could help set market standards. In the commercial sector, the benefits of improved security might make buyers more willing to pay the costs of increased diversity, while vendors could advertise good security as a selling point.
An issue of concern in the heterogeneity model is how applicable it might be to high-value military, intelligence, law enforcement, or critical infrastructure systems. On the one hand, diversity could complicate the operation of these critical systems. On the other hand, the high value of the targets involved may very well justify the additional costs of adopting more heterogeneous systems. Moreover, increased heterogeneity in commercial systems may lead anyway to increased diversity in the government or critical infrastructure operations, since they frequent utilize commercially purchased systems.
There is also potential benefit to be gained in matching outputs from diverse computing processes: agreement among them would suggest a higher probability of valid results. "Voting" systems (such as used with the multiple computers on the Space Shuttle 21 ) could increase confidence in system reliability.
A second question about this approach is whether it might hinder the detection of successful adversary attacks: system behavior might also be less predictable and understandable to owners as well as to attackers. An answer to the question is that heterogeneous systems would generate more data about adversary strategies and tactics, because the adversary would have to conduct more probing experiments to have much chance at successful attacks. A related question is that of reconciling the transparency needed for internal audits and evaluations with the opacity needed to keep adversaries uncertain. One answer would be to limit the auditing function to a very few auditors, but to give them very broad access.
Yet another question is whether prior system penetration would preclude the benefits of moving to greater heterogeneity. An answer is that replacing existing system components with newer, more varied, components could disrupt the existing penetration. And if the penetration were by an insider, the chances would be lessened that any one insider would have complete understanding of the whole system.
Given the change from current practices proposed here, it is clear that considerable analysis, research, testing, and continuous "red team" challenging would be necessary to ascertain exactly where and how the principles of heterogeneity could be most effectively and efficiently applied.
Motivating Secure Behavior
The second explored approach to the future of cyber security, "Motivating Secure Behavior," placed less emphasis than the first on underlying security technologies, and more on the human element. The theme is inspired by taking an economic or market perspective on the security problem. The central concept is that many of the vulnerabilities in current systems can be traced to human behaviors shaped by the structure of incentives facing both suppliers and users of information technology. Therefore, the overall task is to make it easier for people to do the "right" thing and harder to do the "wrong" thing.
The ideal would be to instill a sense of shared responsibility-as opposed to a mindset of forced compliance-among suppliers, system administrators, and users. Education, community mores, and government advocacy might help (though changes in law, regulation and market incentives may be more important). In particular, to encourage the reporting of problems so that the community can address them, users and administrators should not be punished for self-reporting errors in their own security behavior, or blamed for being the victims of cyber attacks.
Responsibilities (and therefore incentives) should be developed for and by different system levels and actors:
• individuals (e.g., US consumers, managers);
• institutions (e.g., Microsoft, universities);
• government agencies (e.g., DOE, Sandia);
• public policy makers(e.g., Congress, Executive Branch, agencies, courts, states), and • standards bodies/associations (e.g., IETF, 22 ICANN, 23 BSA, 24 BITS-FSR 25 ).
Individuals should be given user-friendly tools that make it easier for them to engage in safe computer behavior, such as maintaining protective measures or using safe e-mail practices. A technological challenge is to develop user interfaces that give legitimate users the functionality they need, while making it more difficult for malicious insiders to abuse their access. Institutions providing information technology services might be held to regulated standards of security and penalized by law or civil liability if the do no meet them. Working with industry, insurance companies might establish insurance programs against security-related losses while helping to improve cyber security standards. Government agencies might help set marketplace standards through procurements that emphasize security improvements. The institutions that set public policy could establish standards by law, improve law enforcement against cyber crime, or subsidize research and development in improved security measures. However, the potential threat of future regulation might, in some cases, encourage the private sector to head off the regulation by improving its security performance. Standards bodies could help identify and achieve consensus on the most appropriate and effective security standards. In any case, standards and the incentives to adhere to them should be established not merely for their own sake, but in rational proportion to the harm they are intended to preclude. An apparent disadvantage of the Motivating Secure Behavior approach is that it seems to address only the guardians and the victims, but not the attackers. On the other hand, the concept of deterrence (see above, p. 23 ) is about providing disincentives to attackers, and therefore might in principle be folded into this approach. A particularly vexing kind of attacker is that under the direction of a nation-state. There was some discussion not only of how national adversaries might be deterred, but whether they might be engaged in ways that lessened their motivations to attack and increased their desires to cooperate.
Another disadvantage of the focus on Motivating Secure Behavior is that it is vague about exactly what technologies developers, vendors, buyers, and users should be "incentivized" to create, sell, buy, and use. The implicit assumption is that with the right performance standards adopted and widely accepted, the marketplace will produce the necessary technologies.
Cyber Wellness
Of the three explored approaches to thinking about future cyber security, the "Cyber Wellness" approach is the one which mostly applied a single metaphor: that of human health maintenance. It is also the one that had the widest scope, with analogies from human health that could be applied both to the technical and behavior dimensions of cyber security. The Cyber Wellness approach attempts to take a whole-system perspective on cyber security. Its objective is to keep the population (of users and networked systems) as healthy as possible: resistant to attacks, resilient under stresses, avoiding dangerous environments, treatable if diseased, able to limit contagions. Much responsibility for personal (local) wellness depends on individuals, but various levels of corporate and public health management, from the local to the international, are equally important. Table 1 presents an overview possible mappings from the human wellness to the Cyber Wellness domain. This approach shares with the Motivating Secure Behavior approach an emphasis on the role of individuals in behaving in ways that are protective of their security, as well as providing systemic education and incentives to encourage them to do so. Thus, individuals need to be alert to and avoid risks, maintain their immunizations, have regular "check-ups" to look for incipient problems, seek specialized treatment when appropriate. In this paradigm, users are not blamed for being "stupid," but helped to care for themselves. Even more than the "Motivating" approach, however, Cyber Wellness encourages thinking about the interactions of all the components at all levels of the "health" maintenance system. An issue raised during discussions of the Cyber Wellness metaphor or them was whether it could suggest adequate responses to malevolent, intelligent attacks, given that most human health problems (except use of bioweapons) were not in that category. One answer to this potential objection is that, at least in cases of infectious disease, humans are "under attack" by organisms that, though perhaps not intelligent, are highly configured to penetrate our defenses and cause us damage of some kind. They also frequently have the ability to rapidly adapt to our responses to them. From the perspective of keeping individuals and populations healthy, the question of whether intelligence and malevolence are involved is moot.
It is possible to consider many ways in which the Cyber Wellness approach could be implemented in software and hardware. 26 One of the issues stressed by the group exploring this approach is that, as has frequently been observed, security should be "baked into" information technology systems, not-as has been the rule thus far-added on later almost as an afterthought. This observation leads to the question of how to make the transition to more inherently secure systems. At this workshop, participants adopted a working premise for the sake of discussion: the future of networked computing lies in mobile software agents representing individual users-agents they labeled "avatars." 27 According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security Resource Center, Mobile agents are autonomous software entities that can halt themselves, ship themselves to another agent-enabled host on the network, and continue execution, deciding where to go and what to do along the way. Mobile agents are goal-oriented, can communicate with other agents, and can continue to operate even after the machine that launched them has been removed from the network. 28 In the Cyber Wellness approach, the avatar is the user's presence in computer networks, and is the primary entity whose "health" is monitored and maintained. The avatar may also be supported by other, autonomous mobile agents that monitor agents and platforms, detect and warn of suspicious or malicious activities, and take corrective actions. Such agents might comprise a distributed "sensor" system that provided greater surveillance and warning capabilities than are available in the current CERT model. Each avatar might have a "wellness" index, perhaps resembling today's personal credit scores, that is apparent to other avatars and to host platforms; this index would then be used to limit or expand the avatar's freedom to operate in the system-with the riskiest avatars being quarantined entirely. In this way, each user has a direct incentive to keep his or her avatar in good health. Security is a distributed, rather than centralized, function. 29 The idea of "baking security in" as networked computing makes increasing use of mobile agents sounds more sensible than continuing to adding on security measures after new software and hardware are developed and fielded. Doing so, however would face significant technical challenges. As the NIST Computer Security Resource Center has pointed out,
The mobile agent computing paradigm raises several privacy and security concerns, which clearly are one of the main obstacles to the widespread use and adaptation of this new technology… Mobile agent security issues include: authentication, identification, secure messaging, certification, trusted third parties, non-repudiation, and resource control. Mobile agent frameworks must be able to counter new threats as agent hosts must be protected from malicious agents, agents must be protected from malicious hosts, and agents must be protected from malicious agents.
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Note that, as indicated in this quotation, not only must the avatars carry security protection, but the hosts in the new paradigm would have to be protected just as much as do the computers in the networks of today. 31 Although building security into avatar-oriented computing would be challenging, there is a growing literature on mobile agent security. 32 In fact, the NIST Computer Security Division quoted above has itself a research program on that subject.
As desirable as it may be to "bake in" security, however, the Cyber Wellness approach rejects both the hope that some future end-state of perfect security will be reached and the fear that anything less than perfection is useless. Instead, it accepts that maintaining cyber security will be a long-term, continuing, adaptive process.
Given the costliness of the current U.S. medical care system, one might reasonably ask how Cyber Wellness could be affordably maintained. The answer is that the latter system should be developed going forward in ways that avoid the costliest faults of the former. It is now widely recognized that prevention, disease management, and public health measures are, from a broad perspective, more cost-effective than expensive interventions in acute cases. (And, in contrast to the human health case, "terminally ill" avatars or host platforms may be euthanized-or programmed to self-destruct-without major ethical problems. Not only could they be "resurrected" in a safe environment, but they might exist in multiple instantiations, with intact copies stepping in to perform the functions of infected avatars.) 30 Ibid. 31 A concept mentioned during the workshop was the Trusted Platform Module: TPM (Trusted Platform Module) is a computer chip (microcontroller) that can securely store artifacts used to authenticate the platform (your PC or laptop). These artifacts can include passwords, certificates, or encryption keys. A TPM can also be used to store platform measurements that help ensure that the platform remains trustworthy. Authentication (ensuring that the platform can prove that it is what it claims to be) and attestation (a process helping to prove that a platform is trustworthy and has not been breached) are necessary steps to ensure safer computing in all environments. 
V. Conclusions
Whether used consciously or unconsciously, metaphors are integral to human thought and communication. As with other subjects, this is true in discussions of cyber security. Analyzing the metaphors implicit in the current mainstream of cyber security thought can illuminate the assumptions, logic, and perhaps the limitations of that thought. Experimenting with alternative metaphors can lead to different perspectives on the problem and may even stimulate creatively different ways of dealing with it. In the workshop reported here, participants were inspired to explore three broad concepts for approaching cyber security in the future: one emphasizing the utility of heterogeneously composed computer network systems in defending against cyber attacks; one stressing the importance of finding the right incentives to motivate information technology users, managers, vendors, suppliers, and developers to behave in ways that would make systems more resistant to attack; and one taking a metaphorical "wellness" view of cyber security that might enable a holistic design for "baking" better security into the next generation of information network systems.
Some final observations of workshop participants were that those responsible for setting future directions for cyber security need to
• have a bold vision of where we want to go, then figure out a gradual adoption/implementation strategy;
• accept and sustain a strategy through the inevitably gradual and evolutionary process that will ensue; and
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